

Police RMS Post Implementation Audit June 2019

Lori Brooks Jaquess, CPA, CIA, CGAP, CRMA, City Auditor
Susan Edwards, CIA, CFE, CICA, Assistant City Auditor
Roshan Jayawardene, CISA, Information Technology Auditor



City Auditor's Office

June 24, 2019

Honorable Mayor and Members of the City Council:

The City Auditor's Office has completed the Police RMS (Records Management System) Post Implementation Audit. The purpose of the audit was to evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of the RMS implementation, including system reliability and a comparison of expected versus actual results related to cost, scheduling and the objectives achieved.

Management's response to our audit findings and recommendations, as well as target implementation dates and responsibility, is included following the report.

We would like to thank staff from the Arlington Police and Fire Departments for their cooperation and assistance during the audit.

Lori Brooks Jaquess

Lori Brooks Jaquess, CPA, CIA, CGAP, CRMA
City Auditor

Attachment

c: Trey Yelverton, City Manager
Jim Parajon, Deputy City Manager
Gilbert Perales, Deputy City Manager
Jennifer Wichmann, Assistant City Manager
Will Johnson, Arlington Police Chief
Don Crowson, Arlington Fire Chief

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Executive Summary

The City Auditor's Office has completed the Police RMS (Records Management System) Post Implementation Audit. The performance audit was conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. The audit objectives were to ensure:

- Compliance with the City's purchasing policy, to include appropriate purchasing method and approval
- RMS software is achieving intended operational goals and provision of citizen services
- System interfaces with other software are capable of reliable, accurate and timely transfer of data
- RMS produces accurate statistical data and that global records once merged are accurate and relevant
- The system retains necessary documentation in Corrections (Jail Operations) processing
- The system retains accurate Police evidence location, chain of custody records, and is efficient in submitting evidence for prosecution
- Routine administrative tasks within RMS meet generally accepted system internal controls and are effective in safeguarding operations

The City Auditor's Office noted the following strengths related to the system implementation:

- The system is operational
- Availability of police reports is improved
- Adequate transactional audit trails exist

We noted potential opportunities for improvement in the following areas:

- Coordination with the RMS vendor to provide more details associated with RMS system work orders
- Periodic reconciliation of CAD call number data to RMS records to ensure interface accuracy
- Completion of documentation related to release of inmate property
- Entry of information by appropriate Police personnel for stolen items, including motor vehicles, in a timely manner
- Coordination with the Human Resources and/or City's Information Technology departments to develop a reliable system for notification upon an APD (or other department) employee's termination, to allow for timely deactivation of access profiles in RMS.

Details of audit findings, conclusions and recommendations are included in the following report.

Audit Scope and Methodology

The audit included the following scope and methodology:

- Interviewed pertinent Arlington Police Department (APD) staff regarding system use, system implementation, and data conversion
- Observed daily use of RMS by Patrol, Report, Property Room and Corrections staff, and observed Tech Share evidence upload
- Assessed conversion accuracy and completeness associated with the previous Tiburon system
- Reviewed the vendor contract, payments to the vendor, and the system selection process
- Assessed interfaces associated with the new RMS system for accurate and timely transfer of data
- Examined the efficiency and availability of police reports generated from the new system
- Reviewed Jail inmate processing and the documentation and transfer of inmates to Tarrant County
- Examined system documentation associated with Police evidence and storage

Background

The Arlington Police Department (APD) began the replacement of its records management system (RMS) in April 2015. The previous Tiburon RMS software had been in use since the late 1990's, and the vendor planned to discontinue the software. The search process resulted in APD selecting New World Software Record Management System, which went live in October 2016. New World Software was acquired by Dallas based Tyler Technologies in October 2015 and operates as a subsidiary. Incode, the Arlington Municipal Court Software, is also provided by Tyler Technologies.

System Basics

The new RMS is currently used to support the records and reporting requirements of the APD and to collect, store, and process key information relative to dispatched incidents and crimes. The new RMS consists of four sub sections:

- LERMS - The desktop version of RMS that contains police records and documentation, serves statistical needs, and tracks evidence and evidence storage locations
- MOBILE - The RMS version primarily for field use, compatible with mobile computers and tablets, connected wirelessly. This is the primary RMS tool used by officers on patrol, and is capable of report input and records access from LERMS

- CORRECTIONS - The RMS section used mainly to process arrestees at the City Jail. It records the inmate booking process, tracks inmate possessions and medications, and records inmate incidents as well as the transfer of inmates to other jurisdictions
- NCIC – RMS section for access to National Crime Information Center (NCIC) data and records, as necessary. NCIC is a central data depository for tracking crime related information

The new RMS system receives data from the Arlington Municipal Court and the Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) systems, through active interfaces. This data includes citations issued to citizens and 911 call dispatch related information. Officers use the CAD system during service calls. It contains call text, input from officers assigned to the call, information on call duration, information from criminal information databases such NCIC and TCIC (Texas Criminal Information Center), and other statistical data.

A key variation in the use of the new RMS software is that officers are now writing their own police reports in the system. Previously, dedicated APD Reports Unit staff generated police reports in the Tiburon software from audio tapes. A Police report is generated by the officer who responded to the call for service, usually at the conclusion of the call for service. The reports are reviewed and approved by supervisory staff and finalized by the APD Reports Unit.

Unlike Tiburon, the new system maintains a single global record for an individual that includes all associated past criminal activity, traffic citations, and other contacts related to public safety with Arlington officials. A single global record will enable tracking of criminals and their activity and aid in timely prosecution. Specialized menus exist for tracking gangs, narcotics and documenting special investigations. Photos and other digital media can also be stored as part of a criminal record.

For prosecution, digital Police evidence is uploaded electronically from RMS to Tarrant County via Tech Share, which is a secure file transfer site implemented by Tarrant County. Uploaded documents include lab reports, images and police narratives. Physical evidence is taken to Tarrant County in person.

System Cost

A staff report was submitted to City council on December 2, 2014 and included the following costs for the new system:

- Three-year total cost - \$3,241,257
- Funding Sources - Homeland Security Federal Grants, Capital Equipment Account and Asset Forfeiture Funds
- System purchase cost - \$2,317,084
- Three-year system maintenance costs - \$924,173

The final executed contract reflects the above costs. Except for estimated costs for third party products and services included above, payments to the vendor reconciled to scheduled payments, per the contract. Actual costs for third party products and services were somewhat less than estimated.

Challenges and Potential Future Enhancements

The current Intergraph CAD system and data is managed and controlled by the Communications Division of the Arlington Fire Department (AFD), although much of the CAD data is related to Police Department calls for service. As such, the Arlington Police Department has expressed concerns related to data ownership and integrity. Further, the lack of interface between the APD's New World RMS and the existing AFD Intergraph CAD system presents challenges.

To address the interface issues, the APD has identified potential future system enhancements and communicated these enhancement needs to the City Manager's Office through the IT Governance and budgetary process. The potential enhancements include purchase of the New World Software CAD system, which would create a second Communications Unit; or obtaining licenses from New World Software to use the database intended for the New World CAD software. With the latter option, the New World dispatch database would be populated with current Intergraph CAD software data.

The current audit objectives did not include an analysis of optimal data management and control or planned or desired future enhancements. The audit focused on achievement of agreed upon system requirements and the effects of system implementation on service delivery.

Audit Results

Data Conversion Analysis

At the onset of the audit, APD command staff requested that the data conversion process be reviewed first. At time of system go live, all Tiburon system data was converted to New World RMS. The scripts to convert data from Tiburon were authored by the New World vendor. APD's request for the timing of this review was primarily due to the need to discontinue maintaining the Tiburon database, as this was costly, and funding was needed for other departmental objectives. In August 2018, APD was briefed on the findings and recommendations resulting from the conversion analysis. The system was discontinued with assistance from the New World software vendor in November 2018, after the audit recommendations were reviewed.

Pertinent information and history related to the review of data conversion:

- APD began using Tiburon RMS in 1999
- At the time of Tiburon implementation, data from a legacy Mainframe system was converted with inherited data structure exceptions, such as incomplete and duplicate records and erroneous information in alpha and numeric fields
- Tiburon was updated in 2006 and APD began using Tiburon for tracking evidence and property. Prior to 2006, property and evidence records were retained manually
- Data converted from Tiburon to New World RMS included evidence and property records, criminal case records, narcotics information, gang information, weapons, and records for individuals

The primary goal of this audit procedure was to ensure all Tiburon records were converted to New World RMS. Police records of all types have specific State and Federal compliance requirements related to retention times and availability for prosecution. Key audit tests included the following:

- Review a sample of major crimes prior to October 2016 and identify/assess the associated documentation stored in New World RMS
- Review a sample of major crime cases in New World having less than two associated documents, and compare to the number of documents in Tiburon for the same case
- Reconcile date specific crime type totals between RMS and Tiburon to identify exceptions
- Compare case type totals for selected crimes from Tiburon with those in New World RMS
- Reconcile property/evidence room records to system to ensure case conversion

Data Conversion Audit Results

It was difficult to determine if all Tiburon records were converted to the New World system based on audit testing performed. However, we did not identify any missing documentation or cases during the review. Ensuring accurate and complete conversion of data was difficult due to the following:

- Although “spot checks” were conducted, a record to record reconciliation was not performed at time of data conversion
- The crime types are categorized differently in New World RMS
- A large number of record duplications existed in Tiburon prior to conversion
- Data from Tiburon was not converted to appropriate corresponding data fields in New World RMS. Instead, it was converted in the form of "word pad" documents. Per APD, certain data was intentionally not converted due to known data errors, such as duplications

Audit consulted the vendor about their conversion attempts. The vendor provided a log of converted and rejected records. The vendor believes the records may have been rejected for multiple reasons, including duplications. They also cited that records may have been split into multiple records or in some cases combined. Errors in legacy data were also cited as a reason for duplications and other anomalies. Validating converted data was the responsibility of APD, as stated in the software contract.

Audit Conclusions

Based on audit review, it appears applicable Tiburon data was converted to the new RMS system. APD, however, was advised to do the following:

- Coordinate with the vendor to review the rejected records, as shown in vendor conversion logs
- Retain all conversations with the vendor, as well as the validations of vendor conversion logs, including rejected record log for any future compliance and legal needs

Corrective Action in Progress

During the audit, various issues were identified either through audit tests or discussions with APD Management and System Administrators. In some instances, corrective action was already in progress. Therefore, formal audit recommendations are not included in this report. The issues and noted corrective action in progress are summarized below.

Data Duplication

There is a large volume of duplicated records in the current RMS database. These records are related to individuals with past citations and others, such as crime victims. Duplications existed in the old Tiburon system due to double data entry, spelling errors, name/name spelling variations, and other data entry errors related to individuals. When Tiburon data was converted to New World RMS, these duplications were replicated in the New World RMS system.

As noted earlier, an individual’s records in New World RMS reside in a single global jacket. Ideally, records in the global jacket platform are merged with any arrests and other incidents related to a particular individual. After the merge process, all records and incidents for an individual are combined to form a comprehensive record. As a result of duplicated data, the APD Records Unit staff must review duplicate records to determine if they belong to one individual, based on common denominators, and merge them manually. This manual merge process is performed by only a limited number of selected individuals to prevent merging errors. This control helps ensure a thorough review,

prior to merging. Also, per APD management, upon analysis, they may choose not to consolidate certain records.

APD Management has engaged the New World software vendor to remove data duplications, and they plan to have this task completed by summer 2019.

Interface Errors

The New World RMS system includes several interfaces with other systems for data transfer. The interface with the Municipal Court System, Incode, has not been functioning as intended since the New World RMS go-live in October 2016. The interface error resulted in duplicate citations and associated records in RMS. Per APD management, the cause is inaccurate GPS coordinates. The error was discovered in April 2018. As such, APD management engaged the New World RMS vendor to remove all records from RMS that originated in Incode.

The Incode system retains all citations issued by APD, as well as Code Enforcement, and other City of Arlington agencies (i.e. Water and Animal Services). APD officers use ticket writing software to issue citations from hand held devices. The software is made by Brazos and has been in use since May 2017. The interface between Brazos and Incode transfers all electronically issued citations to Incode for processing, collection of fines, and court activity. Some officers issue hand written tickets. Approximately 16% of the total ticket volume is produced manually and entered into Incode by Municipal Court staff. Per Court management, the number of manual tickets has continued to decrease as a result of collaboration between the APD and the Municipal Court. Per data provided, the percentage of handwritten tickets for FY2018 was reduced to 11%.

APD Management has decided to use an interface directly between Brazos electronic citation software and RMS, in lieu of an interface between Incode and RMS. As such, the handwritten citations now entered manually into Incode by Court staff will need to be entered manually into the RMS system by APD staff. APD management has engaged the New World vendor to create an interface between Brazos and RMS, which is expected to be operational by Summer 2019. A one-time bulk data transfer will be made from Incode to export citations issued since October 2016.

Corrections (Jail) Data Transfer

RMS software includes a separate module for processing inmates at the City Jail. Arrestee crimes include felonies, Class A and B misdemeanors and Arlington Class C warrants. Class A and B misdemeanors and felony crimes are prosecuted by Tarrant county, and the inmates are transferred to Tarrant County Jail.

The new RMS software is capable of transferring inmate information from the time of arrest to the booking process. The information at time of arrest is entered into the system by arresting officers from mobile computers used in the field. However, it was identified during audit review that information from the field was not properly transmitting to the inmate booking process in the system.

Audit notified the RMS system administrators about the error, and corrective action was initiated through a work order to the vendor. It is expected the error will be rectified within the normal time frame of about 2-3 weeks, based on priority, through the routine maintenance and troubleshooting process. As a result of the information transfer error in the system, staff responsible for inmate intake

must rekey arrestee information into the system. No other adverse impact, such as an erroneous inmate release, was identified as a result of the data transmission error.

Property Room

Audit review included examining the storage, documentation and information accuracy related to Police property and evidence, as reflected in the new RMS system. Audit review included testing to ensure property and evidence was accurately converted from the old Tiburon system.

Although not within the scope of this current audit, it was noted that the property room appears to be at capacity in its main storage location. The number of cases with associated property and evidence storage requirements continues to grow. Currently, additional storage areas include rented spaces outside of City owned facilities, and concerns exist about the physical security and access controls related to these locations. Non-City owned storage locations house many key evidence items related to unsolved cases and evidence that requires storage for specific required time periods due to State or Federal law compliance. Acquisition of new or additional storage facility/facilities with adequate safety and security measures appears necessary.

The Police Department's FY19 budget includes partial funding related to evidence storage needs. The department has communicated to City management their need for future funding to fully accomplish this goal.

Policies and Procedures for Police Reports Unit

The City Auditor's Office was unable to assure that revised guidelines exist for the new methodologies used for generating police reports after the implementation of the new RMS software. The staff stated that documentation was drafted and is currently in the process of being reviewed by police management.

Detailed Audit Findings

Vendor Details About RMS Work Orders

During the normal course of operations, various system malfunctions are reported by system users. A work order is then initiated using a designated priority code to help ensure timely resolution. RMS work orders are submitted to the vendor via a web application by the APD RMS System Administrator or other systems-related APD staff members. It was noted that minimal information is available to the RMS System Administrator on the vendor website about the RMS work orders submitted. It does not provide detailed information about the corrective action initiated by the vendor, or provide information related to when a work order was closed as a result of corrective action.

The vendor website currently lists the work order number, date of initiation and modification, case title and the priority level. Once a specific case is accessed, it does not provide any additional information that could be useful to system administrators.

As noted above, the vendor has set up a web-based application to receive software service requests, per the ongoing maintenance agreement between the City and New World. The work order classification, critical to priority 1 through 4, establishes a hierarchy for the vendor to follow when initiating corrective action. However, the current software maintenance agreement does not include specific standards related to communicating information or timeline for pending work orders.

Due to the lack of detailed information, system administrators cannot determine when a work order has been rectified and closed, or whether the vendor initiated corrective action based on its reported priority level. The only date information currently available is the last modified date, which can either be the date it was closed or when a user updated the work order with other information. If the vendor provided more detailed information about the cause of the reported problem and corrective action taken, system administrators would be better able to troubleshoot future system failures and expedite resolution without vendor intervention.

The vendor has expressed an intention to share detailed information in the future, as the system is upgraded. However, it would involve coordination and monitoring by system administrators.

Recommendation:

- 1. The City Auditor's Office recommends that the Arlington Police Chief ensure the RMS System Administrator coordinates with the RMS vendor to provide detailed work order information to APD staff through its work order web portal and monitor progress to ensure information is made available in a timely manner.***

Reconciliation of Data Transfer Between CAD and RMS

Routine reconciliation of data transferred from the Intergraph CAD (dispatch) system to RMS is needed to ensure complete data transfer. APD calls for service records are transferred to RMS from the CAD software via an interface. The record transfer occurs while the call is in progress, after a call is closed, and at the end of the day. Transferred call records include service calls requiring a police report, as well as other incidents that do not warrant a report, such as traffic stops.

A manual record reconciliation between the two systems resulted in noted discrepancies. The days reconciled were randomly selected during CY2017 and 2018. The reconciliation results are shown in the following table:

Random Date	APD Calls in CAD	CAD Calls in RMS	Variance
2/17/2017	1077	1077	0
3/6/2017	821	821	0
3/14/2017	974	974	0
4/7/2017	1003	996	-7
6/11/2017	892	752	-140
6/18/2017	966	641	-325
6/19/2017	899	761	-138
6/20/2017	930	781	-149
7/8/2017	1002	878	-124
7/16/2017	839	740	-99
8/14/2017	835	723	-112
9/10/2017	743	652	-91
10/13/2017	904	786	-118
10/24/2017	925	784	-141
12/12/2017	995	855	-140
12/25/2017	396	354	-42
2/12/2018	1005	863	-142
4/10/2018	1107	1102	-5
6/8/2018	1002	1000	-2
7/27/2018	1122	1117	-5
9/24/2018	896	895	-1
9/26/2018	1009	1003	-6
10/31/2018	728	728	0
11/8/2018	991	988	-3
12/1/2018	945	944	-1

The discrepancies appear to be more prevalent in 2017 and have been reduced since March 2018. As part of this review, the Arlington Fire Department Dispatch Services staff attempted to manually transfer 10 APD incidents in CAD that had not transferred electronically to RMS. Five records were successfully transferred, while five records were not accepted by RMS.

CAD service calls for APD transfer over to RMS as incidents. Transferred records are used to create police reports, document evidence, and generate arrestee documentation used in the City Jail. Per APD management, they do not rely on RMS data for reporting and statistical purposes. They utilize CAD data for these purposes.

CAD software administrators cited the following as possible causes of data transfer failures:

- Network being taken offline for scheduled maintenance
- Mismatch of GIS (Geographic data) information associated with the location of the service call

The record transfers between the two systems are not currently reconciled. CAD (Fire Department software) administrators in Dispatch Services are unable to troubleshoot, due to lack of access to RMS software (Arlington Police Department software). The interface to RMS was designed by CAD administrators with assistance from the new RMS vendor.

Currently, when records fail to transfer automatically to RMS, the RMS users request that CAD incidents be transferred manually. Generally, these cases involve incidents where there is a need for police reports, evidence management, or involve inmate incarceration. Although a manual process is used to meet immediate operational needs when data transfer failures occur, incomplete data transfer has an impact on other RMS system features. For example, the record for a service call that does not result in a police report fails to transfer to RMS as an incident, but the service call record includes a particular location or address that may be useful later. For instance, officers responding to the same address at a future date will be unaware of the history of calls at that specific location.

The RMS system is designed to gather information, pertaining to all police operations, from other systems to ensure global records are accurate. Global records are merged with crime cases to form a complete history for an individual or location within the City. Although the RMS system is intended to serve all of APD case reporting needs independently, APD staff responsible for reporting statistical data obtain their data for this purpose from CAD, rather than RMS.

Recommendation:

2. ***The City Auditor's Office recommends that the Arlington Police Chief ensure the RMS System Administrator reconciles CAD data transfers on a periodic basis; and perform error analysis, with both the vendor and CAD Administrator assistance, during data transfer failures.***

Inmate Processing Documentation

The new RMS system includes a separate menu for processing inmates at the City Jail. Individuals arrested due to police activity or outstanding warrants, and those surrendering due to warrants, are housed at this facility. A sample of arrest records was reviewed to verify that proper documentation is retained and to ensure inmate releases were authorized.

A sample of 29 Jail arrest cases between the time period of August 2017 and April 2018 were reviewed. The review identified several instances where inmate or third-party signature was not identified in the system for return of personal items or medications at the time of exit or transfer.

The documentation variances identified during the audit may be the result of a lack of management oversight. There is no verifiable quality assurance process for inmate documentation.

In the event there is no documentation of an inmate's acknowledgement of the receipt of their personal items and medications at the time of release, the City can be held liable for those items. For those inmates transferred to Tarrant county, the documentation must also show the chain of custody for the items.

For the sample of cases reviewed, it is important to note we did not identify any erroneous inmate releases or transfers. The variances identified were related only to documentation within the system.

Recommendation:

- 3. The City Auditor's Office recommends that the Arlington Police Chief consider establishing a quality assurance program to ensure complete documentation related to release of inmate property is retained in the system.***

Population of Key Data Fields Related to Stolen Items

The new RMS system includes data fields for reported stolen items, such as vehicles, weapons, and other stolen merchandise. The data is entered in the system under specified tabs by police personnel responsible for processing stolen items. During the review of the new RMS system, we noted data fields for stolen items were missing key information. The missing information was for items stolen since RMS implementation in October 2016 and did not include converted Tiburon data. Tiburon data cannot be populated to appropriate RMS data fields, due to technical limitations.

Stolen items are reported to NCIC and TCIC databases by Dispatch Services staff. Information includes identification numbers of stolen vehicles, serial numbers of weapons and other identifying information pertaining to stolen merchandise. Vehicle information, such as the identification number, is verified in the NCIC and TCIC databases for accuracy, prior to entering as stolen. After the initial entry is made, the State of Texas validates the accuracy of entered stolen vehicle information through a monthly audit process.

When NCIC and TCIC databases are updated, information is available to other law enforcement agencies as vehicles and items stolen from Arlington.

Currently, there is no quality assurance process to ensure stolen item data is entered in RMS. Dispatch Services' personnel are responsible only for documenting RMS when NCIC items are cleared from the national database; for example, when stolen vehicles are recovered. Data entry to RMS for stolen items, however, is performed by Police officers and other APD administrative staff.

The lack of stolen item information is hindering the monthly State data validation and compliance audit process. Dispatch staff must search various documents, such as police reports, to validate NCIC and TCIC entries, which is time consuming. If the data fields for stolen items are properly populated, currently available RMS reports will compile data for easy validation of NCIC and TCIC entries.

Recommendation:

4. ***The City Auditor's Office recommends that the Arlington Police Chief ensure that appropriate Police personnel enter information for stolen items, including motor vehicles, in a timely manner.***

Employee Termination Notices

A review of RMS security practices indicated that former APD employees have active access profiles in RMS software. A list of 72 recent APD terminated employees was extracted from the Lawson Human Resource system and compared to active access profiles in RMS software. Twenty-one of the former staff members had active access profiles.

Current City of Arlington Information Technology policy requires termination of an employee's City network access upon termination. The Human Resources department coordinates with the City's network services staff to terminate an employee's network access. However, terminating access to applications controlled by an individual department remains a departmental responsibility. Generally Accepted Information Technology Security Practices recommend timely termination of access upon staff separations to safeguard data and intellectual property.

We did not identify a reliable notification process for communicating employee separations to the system administrators responsible for managing department-specific applications. Currently, the RMS system administrator relies on departmental newsletters and/or emails from managers to learn about terminations and deactivate RMS profiles. This is particularly problematic as it relates to non-Police employees having access to RMS (i.e. Municipal Court, Fire staff). A central notification system forwarding termination information from the Human Resources and/or Information Technology departments to departmental system administrators does not exist but would be helpful. It is important to note that the Information Technology department does not oversee departmental software applications, including hosted applications used by individual departments.

The presence of former employees' active profiles in the system could result in unauthorized access to RMS data. City network access terminations and audit trails within the system mitigate some risks associated with former employees having active profiles in departmental systems. However, an effective methodology to terminate both departmental application profiles and network access is needed.

Recommendation:

5. ***The City Auditor's Office recommends that the Arlington Police Chief ensure RMS system administrators coordinate with the Human Resources and/or City's Information Technology departments to develop a reliable system for notification upon an APD (or other department) employee's termination, to allow for timely deactivation of access profiles in RMS.***

**CITY OF ARLINGTON
POLICE RMS POST IMPLEMENTATION AUDIT
AUDIT RECOMMENDATIONS AND RESPONSE**

RECOMMENDATION	CONCUR/ DO NOT CONCUR	MANAGEMENT RESPONSE	RESPONSIBLE PARTY	DUE DATE
<p>1. <i>The City Auditor’s Office recommends that the Arlington Police Chief ensure the RMS System Administrator coordinates with the RMS vendor to provide detailed work order information to APD staff through its work order web portal and monitor progress to ensure information is made available in a timely manner.</i></p>	<p>Concur</p>	<p>We have met with the vendor's executives. The vendor recently migrated to a new work order software solution, and the new solution provided limited work order information during the implementation. The vendor's migration project is complete. Moving forward, APD now has greater access to the information within the vendor's work order solution.</p>	<p>Brett Dove, Research and Development Manager</p>	<p>Completed</p>

<p>2. <i>The City Auditor’s Office recommends that the Arlington Police Chief ensure the RMS System Administrator reconciles CAD data transfers on a periodic basis; and perform error analysis, with both the vendor and CAD Administrator assistance, during data transfer failures.</i></p>	<p>Concur</p>	<p>The RMS System Administrators will collaborate with the Intergraph CAD System Administrators to enhance existing interfaces to ensure all intended data is properly transferred. CAD call data that does not transfer over is typically related to the address used in the CAD mapping system not verifying in the RMS mapping system. The reason for this is CAD uses a different mapping system that is not the city GIS ESRI map that feeds RMS. This is an issue with having separate CAD and RMS systems.</p>	<p>APD R&D Unit & AFD Dispatch Services CAD Team</p>	<p>30-Aug-19</p>
<p>3. <i>The City Auditor's Office recommends that the Arlington Police Chief consider establishing a quality assurance program to ensure complete documentation related to release of inmate property is retained in the system.</i></p>	<p>Both</p>	<p>We concur that there could be stronger oversight on the property release process. Inmates cannot be released without all possessions released to them or seized possessions being categorized correctly to show APD retaining possession. Jail chain of command will review the current process and see what steps if any can be taken for stronger oversight but still maintain operational efficiency.</p>	<p>Tarrick McGuire, Deputy Chief of Technical Services Division</p>	<p>30-Aug-19</p>

<p>4. The City Auditor's Office recommends that the Arlington Police Chief ensure that appropriate Police personnel enter information for stolen items, including motor vehicles, in a timely manner.</p>	<p>Both</p>	<p>There are policies governed by NCIC/TCIC relating to the entry of items and the timing of those items. Items cannot be listed as stolen without specific identifying information and if the victim cannot provide that information at the time of the report, the item cannot be listed on NCIC/TCIC nor can it be listed in the report. When the victim contacts records or another police employee (usually a detective assigned the case) that information is added to the report and appropriate fields. The police department will review our current process and see if there are areas in need of improvement.</p>	<p>Lora Logan, Business Resource Manager</p>	<p>30-Aug-19</p>
<p>5. The City Auditor's Office recommends that the Arlington Police Chief ensure RMS system administrators coordinate with the Human Resources and/or Information Technology departments to develop a reliable system for notification upon an APD (or other department) employee's termination, to allow for timely deactivation of access profiles in RMS.</p>	<p>Concur</p>	<p>The RMS system administrators will coordinate with the Human Resources and the Information Technology departments to develop a reliable system for notification upon an employee's termination to allow for timely deactivation of access profiles in RMS.</p> <p>It is necessary to note that the City Auditor was not aware of the multi-step RMS deactivation processes and that not all twenty-</p>	<p>Brett Dove, Research and Development Manager</p>	<p>30-Aug-19</p>

		<p>one former staff members' RMS user accounts identified in the audit were login capable. Regardless, we can make improvements to the termination deactivation process for all RMS users, especially for New World RMS users in the Fire Department, City Attorney's Office, and City Auditor's Office.</p> <p><i>Audit Note: Although a multi-step process may exist for user deactivation, exceptions noted during audit testing showed the overall profile to still be active. The City Auditor's Office is aware that the immediate risk of unauthorized access is somewhat mitigated by deactivation of network access by the City's Information Technology Group.</i></p> <p>IT Response: Information Technology developed an automated notification report of disabled accounts based on Lawson activity which is sent to the APD-R&D manager. IT has also submitted an FY2020 budget proposal to enhance the Service Management system to notify department application administrators about required</p>		
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		security changes when users separate or change roles.		
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